Serres National Cadaster: An Intestate Succession Preliminary Case Study

Athanasios L. Athanasenas, Xanthippi Chapsa, Persefoni Polychronidou


In the famous “anti-Commons” theory, resources are underused when multiple owners are endowed with the right to exclude other potential users, in contrast to the “Commons” theory that identifies resource over-exploitation. In this crucial preliminary study, “Intestate Succession” (i.e. “Succession without Will”) is under investigation, thus evaluating whether the number of land cotenants (heirs, in “Intestate Succession”) affects significantly (or not) land market values, by taking into account certain significant economic variables, representing the whole population official and primary data, officially available from the municipal Serres Farmlands. Applying advanced GLM, we perform ANCOVA analysis, considering as dependent variable the market land value. We find that, controlling for the objective land value (IRS land value), location, irrigation, farmer identity, and land segmentation-fragmentation all affect significantly the market land value variable. Significantly, the number of heirs does not seem to be a significant factor yet in the context of the “anti-Commons” theory.


intestate succession; commons vs. anti-Commons theories; national cadastre; GLM; ANCOVA.

JEL Codes

C13; O18; R11; Q15.

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